I. Introduction
Income is increasingly concentrated when measured with income tax data (Piketty and Saez, 2003 and updates) or with survey data (Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus, 2016; Fisher, Johnson, Smeeding, and Thompson, 2018) . But while the trend is toward rising concentration, the recent time series has notable variation, rising in expansionary periods and falling in contractionary periods in a pro-cyclical pattern. The factors explaining the rise and fall in income concentration are not fully understood, but some of the most prominent explanations for rising top incomes highlight the role played by individuals-who may be "superstars" (Rosen, 1981) or "rent seekers" (Bivens and Mishel, 2013 )-whose compensation is relatively volatile from one year to the next Fried, 2003, Kaplan and Rauh, 2013, among others).
Income tax returns have emerged as a key resource for studying levels and trends in U.S.
income inequality (Piketty Saez, 2003 and updates; DeBacker, Heim, Panousi, Ramnath, and Vidangos, 2012; Auten, Gee, and Turner, 2013; CBO, 2014) . Tax returns offer many advantages for studying inequality: the data sets are large, timely, span many years, and include high-income households. But up to this point the inequality estimates from these data are primarily based on annual cross-sections, leaving the role of income volatility at the top unresolved. In past research, lengthening the period over which income is measured produces lower measures of concentration at a point in time. Inequality statistics using lifetime incomemeasured over 40 years using Swedish administrative data-were 35 to 40 percent smaller than those based on annual data (Bjorklund, 1993) . In non-recessionary periods of our sample of U.S.
families, the average difference between annual and permanent income concentration estimates is between 7 and 29 percent depending on the top-income group, suggesting that using three-year income panels can go a long way toward proxying for permanent income.
We know much less about whether using permanent income affects inequality trends, particularly of top share measures over the last two decades. Cross-section income measures have both permanent and transitory components, and any cyclical or trend variability in the transitory component implies that inequality measures may not be comparable over time. Using tax data can further compound this effect, as cyclical or trend movements in income realization-whether by type of income realized, timing of realizations, or pairing of gains and losses-further distorts underlying transitory income volatility.
However, the three-year income panels used here can help disentangle these factors. We demonstrate that income concentration growth rates are comparable in the permanent income and annual income groupings during our sample period, implying that the growth in income concentration cannot be explained by this volatility (Figure 2 ).
Further, we also evaluate the contribution of income volatility to rising top-income shares by estimating the probability of remaining at very high-levels of the income distribution-including the top 10, 5, 1, 0.1, .01 and top .001 percent-over consecutive years. If rising volatility is important for rising top shares in the cross-section, we would expect to see the likelihood of remaining at top across multiple consecutive years decline over time. However, we demonstrate that the probability of remaining in the highest income groups increased during our sample period, suggesting that top incomes have become less volatile in this dimension (Figure 8 ).
We repeat the above exercises using income measured in the Survey of Consumer Finances (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, various years). As in the income tax data, permanent income concentration in the SCF is lower than annual income concentration, but the trend in income concentration is rising similarly in both measures.
The SCF shares some of the features of the income tax data, as the SCF relies on a heavy oversample of high income and wealth families-sampled from the same data as above-to credibly estimate the top of the distribution. But there are also key measurement differences that make the similar findings more remarkable. The SCF is a cross section, but measures permanent income through a survey question, rather than through a panel. When annual income is reported to be higher (or lower) than normal, the questionnaire collects an assessment of the family's usual income, which serves as a proxy for permanent income (Ackerman and Sabelhaus, 2012) .
Further, the SCF data are at the family level, while the income tax data are analyzed at the taxunit level.
In the next section we briefly review relevant recent literature on both top-income shares and the role of volatility in longer-terms inequality trends more generally. In section three, we discuss the tax data and describe how we construct the three-year panels. In the fourth section we review trends in the probability of staying in top-income groups across multiple years, as well as levels and trends in top-share inequality using 3-year income rankings.
II. Previous Literature Explaining Trends in Top Income Shares
In general, rising tax-unit or household-level income volatility could lead to rising top shares in the cross-section if high-income units increasingly receive income that is concentrated into single years instead of being smoothed over several years. Changing compensation practices, including a shift toward bonuses, stock options, and other forms of irregular pay and away from regular salaries, are one possible mechanism. Shifts in industrial or occupational compositiontoward those with more highly variable pay and away from those with more stable pay -would achieve the same effect. Business owners and other asset holders altering their behavior, such that they become more likely to concentrate realization of gains and less likely to smooth them over time, could also produce the same outcome.
Some of the earlier papers discussing rising top-income shares focused on the out-sized role of CEO pay. In a series of papers, co-authors (2003 and 2005) documented a steady rise in CEO pay as a share of firm total earnings and an accompanying shift in the composition of CEO pay toward equity-based compensation. While Bebchuck evaluated rising managerial power and failures in corporate governance, other researchers trying to understand the role of CEO compensation in driving top income shares looked instead to the erosion of social norms and tax policies that previously constrained managerial pay (Levy and Temin, 2007; Piketty and Saez, 2003) . Kaplan and Rauh (2013) argue that the driving force behind rising top-shares is not isolated to CEOs, pointing to large increases in fee income for hedge funds and private equity investors, as well rising self-employment, partnership, and S-corp income by owners of closely-held businesses, along with that of corporate attorney and top athletes. Since rising top-incomes are not isolated to environments that are subject to greater managerial power or changing social norms on what managers should earn, Kaplan and Rauh argue in favor of Harvey Rosen's (1981) more market-oriented "superstar" theory. According to the "superstar" theory, modern advances in technology and communications have allowed high-performing individuals in various fields to reach mass audiences and capture outsize share of the income in the fields where they operate. Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012) use tax data to examine the occupations and incomes of top income individuals, and find a group that doesn't so much resemble "superstars" using technology and modern communications to reach mass audiences, as much as managers from nearly every industry type and a large portion of the finance industry. They report "executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals can account for… 70 percent of the share of national income going to the top 0.1 percent of the distribution of income between 1979 and
2005." The prominent role of managers and the finance industry is more consistent, Bivens and Mishel (2013) argue, with a story of rent-seeking. More recently, Jones and Kim (2017) develop a "Schumpeterian" model which points to efforts by entrepreneurs to exponentially expand their income, which is restrained by the creative destruction efforts of outside innovators to generate the pattern of top-income inequality that we observe in the US.
This brief summary certainly does not exhaust all of the explanations put forth to explain the long-term rise in top income shares. Suffice to say that the high-income individuals and sectors highlighted in these accounts also have relatively volatile incomes. As such, they are potentially consistent with the idea that rising volatility could be responsible for some of the rise in top shares that we observe in the cross-section.
Largely distinct from the literature exploring the evolution of top-income shares is a body of research evaluating volatility -decomposing the transitory and the persistent components of the variance -in income and income inequality trends. 2 Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) Most of this research has focused on income across the entire distribution, and is not explicitly focused on top-incomes or any specific sub-groups. One exception is Jensen and Shore (2015) who use the PSID and find that all of the increase in average income volatility is attributable to households who are either self-employed or who self-identify as risk-tolerant.
Guvenen, Kaplan, and Song (2014) Our paper combines these two strands of the literature, exploring changes in top-income shares, specifically evaluating the role of income volatility in influencing longer term trends. In doing so, this paper is most similar to Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) and Auten, Gee, and Turner (2013) . Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) with a single year of data, but both measures follow the identical long-term trend. They also calculate probabilities of remaining in top one percent for three and five consecutive years, respectively. They find that the probability of remaining at the top of the earnings distribution for consecutive years was steady or slightly rising between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, at which point the probability of remaining at the top started to decline. Auten, Gee, and Turner (2013) In this paper, we extend both of these earlier papers in different ways. Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) are evaluating top-earning workers, whereas we are looking to high-income households. While Auten, Gee, and Turner (2013) evaluate persistence of filing unit incomes over consecutive years, we are also comparing top-shares in single years versus multiple combined years. And, relative to both of these earlier papers, we are using more updated data, covering up through 2013, and we are also exploring top shares and persistence measures much higher up the distribution -successively smaller groups up through the top .001 percent of the income distribution.
III. IRS and SCF Data

The Statistics of Income Insole File
This analysis draws on two different data sets. The primary dataset is the Statistics of Income (SOI) Divisions annual Insole file which is a sample of individual income tax returns.
The second dataset, used to create the 3-year centered panels and described in more detail below, is a population file of all individual income tax returns maintained by the IRS.
The single-year cross section for each year of the analysis is based on the SOI Insole file, which contains data that are estimates from a probability sample of unaudited Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ (including electronic returns) filed by U.S.
citizens and residents during a Calendar Year. All returns processed during were subjected to sampling except tentative and amended returns.
3
The sample design is a stratified probability sample, in which the population of tax returns is classified into subpopulations, called strata, and a sample is randomly selected independently from each stratum. Strata are defined by the following characteristics: nontaxable (including no alternative minimum tax) with adjusted gross income or expanded income of $200,000 or more;
high business receipts of $50,000,000 or more; presence or absence of special forms or schedules (Form 2555, Form 1116, Form 1040 Schedule C, and Form 1040 Schedule F), and; indexed positive or negative income. 4 The sampling rates range from 0.10 percent to 100 percent. Weights were obtained by dividing the population count of returns in a stratum by the number of sample returns for that stratum. The weights were adjusted to correct for misclassified returns.
The SOI data are attractive for measuring the distribution of income for a host of reasons.
The data have been gathered in a consistent fashion for a very long period of time and provide nearly universal coverage of the population, particularly at the top of the income distribution.
The data sets are also very large, with the administrative records for individual income tax filings including 164 million returns (in 2013), and the samples used for analysis containing nearly 340,000 returns (in 2013) (Appendix Table 1 ).
There are also several important limitations to using the SOI data as well. Since they are based on tax records, SOI income data are subject to changes in the definition of taxable income.
3 Tentative returns were not subjected to sampling because the revised returns may have been sampled later, while amended returns were excluded because the original returns had already been subjected to sampling. A small percentage of returns were not identified as tentative or amended until after sampling. These returns, along with those that contained no income information or frivolous or fraudulent income information when recognized, were excluded in calculating estimates. 4 Sixty variables are used to derive positive and negative incomes. These positive and negative income classes are deflated using the Chain-Type Price Index for the Gross Domestic Product to represent a base year of 1991. 5 Tax data processed to the IRS Individual Master File at the Enterprise Computing Center at Martinsburg during a Calendar Year were used to assign each taxpayer's record to the appropriate stratum and to determine whether or not the record should be included in the sample. Records are selected for the sample either if they possess certain combinations of the four ending digits of the social security number, or if their five ending digits of an eleven-digit number generated by a mathematical transformation of the SSN is less than or equal to the stratum sampling rate times 100,000.
In addition, the data are also influenced by non-filing and underreporting of income -due to either evasion or avoidance -and changes in income realization behavior due to changes in tax policy. To help strengthen the analysis using the SOI data, a "dummy" record was added to each SOI tax year to help represent non-filers. The dummy record was given a weight to represent the number of non-filers for each tax year. Income for non-filers is calculated using a similar approach as Piketty and Saez (2003) , assuming non-filers have incomes that are 20 percent of the mean for filers. In the analysis, tables, and figures presented below, total income and total number of returns are the sum of the income and returns actually reported on tax returns as well as this correction for non-filers. Since non-filers fall at the bottom of the income distribution, this correction lowers the income thresholds for entry into the top-income groups.
The very large data sets and near-universal coverage allow us to calculate income statistics for income groups at the very top of the income distribution, as high as the top .001 percent. In this paper we study trends for that group as well as for other top-income groups, including the top .01, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percents. Since the data also include the full range of income components reported on the Form 1040, we can also estimate the distribution of different income concepts. Here we explore the distribution of total income as well as total income minus capital gains.
The unique coverage of the entire distribution of income is conveyed in Tables 1 and 2, which show mean income and shares of income held by small groups at the very top of the distribution. Mean income for tax units in the top .001 percent of the distribution, for example, was $111 million in 2013, and they received 1.9 percent of all income ( Table 1) . Excluding capital gains, mean income and share of income for the top .001 percent were $68 million and 1.2 percent, respectively ( Table 2) .
These top-income shares track very closely with the well-known Piketty and Saez (2003) series based on the same underlying data (Appendix Figure 1) . The Piketty and Saez series cover a much longer time-span and follow the identical trend, only differing by a few tenths of a percent in any given year. The top 1 percent share of total income in the SOI series, for example, rose from 17.7 percent in 1997 to 19.7 percent in 2013; in the Piketty and Saez series, the top 1 percent share rose from 18.0 to 20.1 percent over the same period.
The tax data also contain some information on household composition, including whether a return is filed by someone who is a dependent of another tax filing unit. Dependent filers do not represent distinct economic units or even, commonly, households. Since dependent filers overwhelmingly report very low incomes, their inclusion mechanically increases top-income share estimates. The top 1 percent share of total income estimated on the sample excluding dependent filers (Table 3) 
Constructing the 3-year "centered" panels
In order to explore the impact of tax-unit-level income volatility on top-share estimates, we construct a series of short "centered" panels. The process starts with the base year ("t") where all records are selected from the SOI Insole File. The records from the base year were then matched to the pre ("t-1") and post ("t+1") years SOI Insole Files. The base record was first attempted to be matched where the SSN was the primary, and if no match existed it was attempted to be matched where the SSN was the secondary. Wherever a match existed tax data was collected from the SOI Insole Files.
When a match did not exist to a pre-or post-year SOI file, the base year record was matched to the pre and post years population file. The base year record was first attempted to match the population file where the SSN was the primary SSN. If there was not a match on the primary SSN for pre and post years with the base record SSN then it was matched where the SSN was a secondary SSN. 6 We also include reported negative incomes in the data as well.
The base year records were all then combined to create the 3 year panel. The weights from the SOI sample were then applied to the sample records to create the estimates used throughout the paper.
In some cases, matching tax units across years is not possible. This can occur when returns are not filed in some years, due possibly to death of the tax filer, immigration or emigration, income falling beneath filing requirement levels, or "maturation" when individuals transition from dependents to independent filers. Linking tax units across years also is complicated when filing units dissolve or form through divorce and marriage, and also when couples change status from filing jointly to separately.
Despite the various obstacles, we are able to successfully match the vast majority of returns across tax years. In 2012, for example, we matched 90 percent of all non-dependent tax units with the return they filed in the previous tax year (2011) and the same percentage with the return they filed in the following (2013) year ( Table 4) . The match rate is even higher for top-income households. For tax units in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, the 2012 match rates were 97 percent for both the previous and the following tax years. Match rates in the top 1 percent fluctuated between 95 and 98 percent over the entire period, exhibiting no noticeable trend (Appendix Figure 4) . Overall match rates for all returns dipped slightly following the financial crisis, but remained at 90 percent.
The Survey of Consumer Finances Data
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a cross-section survey, conducted every three years by NORC on behalf of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and with the cooperation of the Department of Treasury (Statistics of Income (SOI) Division). 7 The SCF provides the most comprehensive and highest quality survey microdata available on U.S. household wealth. SCF families respond to questions about financial and nonfinancial assets, debts, employment, income, and household demographics.
7 See Bricker, et al (2017) for results from the most recent triennial SCF. A great degree of security is involved with this sampling procedure and formal contract govern the agreement between the FRB, NORC and SOI. The FRB selects the sample from an anonymized data file. The FRB sends the sampled list to SOI, who remove the famous families and passes along the list to NORC for contacting. NORC collects the survey information and sends to FRB. Thus, the FRB never knows any contacting information, SOI never knows any survey responses, and NORC never knows anything more than survey responses and location information.
Measuring income and wealth at the top using simple random sampling is not viable due to the concentrated nature of economic resources. Thin tails at the top lead to large sampling variability, and disproportional non-participation at the top biases down top-share estimates.
Both make measuring wealth concentration extremely difficult. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) overcomes both problems by oversampling at the top using administrative data derived from income tax records (the INSOLE file, described earlier), and by verifying that the top is represented using targeted response rates in several high-end strata (Bricker, Henriques, and Moore, 2017) . The list sample ensures that the SCF has adequate representation of the upper tail of the wealth distribution and ensures adequate representation of sparsely held assets.
IV. Alternative Top-Share Estimates and Persistence Measures
IV.A. Alternative Top Shares
Within top income groups, the mean of three years of income is typically considerably smaller than the mean of annual income. For tax units in the top .01 percent of the distribution of 2012 income (excluding dependent filers), the single year average income was $34 million (Table 3) , and the 3-year average was $23 million (Table 5A) . nearly 50 percent larger when calculated using a single year of income (2.5 percent) than when it is based on the average of three years of income (1.7 percent) ( Figure 1C) .
The moderating influence of using multiple years of income, however, is somewhat offset when all years of income are used to rank tax units as well as calculate average income and top shares. The top .001 percent share of total income for the 3-year period centered on 2007, when ranked by the 3-year average, is 2.0 percent (Table 5B ). Comparing trends in the top .01 percent income share, we see that both of the 3-year estimates, whether ranked by the 1-year or 3-year averages, are less cyclical than the single-year estimates, not exhibiting the same spike at the business cycle peak (Figure 2A) . The peak-to-trough changes in the 3-year top share estimates are from one-third to two-thirds as large as the increase that we see over the business cycle for the single-year measure. Despite differences in levels and cyclicality, however, all three different alternatives for estimating top-income shares (1-year ranking & income; 1-year ranking & 3-year income; and 3-year ranking and income) follow the same longer-term trend.
The impacts of moving to the three-year measures are much less evident when using income minus capital gains. This is unsurprising, as capital gains are probably the most volatile income component. Even still, the single-year top .01 percent share, for example, is considerably more cyclical than either of the 3-year measures ( Figure 2B ). As with total income, all three top .01 percent share estimates estimated using income minus capital gains follow the same trend.
The final set of top-income shares we explore is for a series of non-overlapping sub-groups, first within the top one percent and then within the top 10 percent of the distribution. We already know that the impact on income shares from shifting to multiple years of income is greater for higher-income groups, but this will let us see how far down the distribution we see meaningful differences between the single and 3-year estimates. Figure 2 (1-year ranking and income; 1-year ranking and 3-year income; and 3-year ranking and income). In the first three sub-figures (3A, 3B, 3C), representing groups down to the 99.9 th percentile of the distribution, we see that the 3-year estimates do not have the same pronounced spike in top-shares at in the business cycle peak that we see in the single-year estimates. 9 For the fourth group (representing the 99.9 th percentile down to the 99 th ), however, there is no longer any noticeable difference at business cycle peaks, instead suggesting a slight buffering at the trough, not falling as low as the single year measure. In each of the four subgroups within the top one percent the income shares follow the same longer term trend regardless of the number of years of data used for ranking or calculating shares.
For the three subgroups within the top 10 percent of the total income distribution, we can only observe any impact of shifting to three years of income for the top one percent ( Figure 4A ).
For the "next four" percent (99 th to 95 th percentiles) and the "next 5" percent (95 th to 90 th percentiles) the three alternative top-share estimates are indistinguishable (Figures 4B, 4C ).
Comparable top share statistics can be calculated using data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances. The SCF is only a cross-sectional survey, but asks households for the "usual" income they receive in a "normal" year, which proxies for permanent income. Similar to the tax data, the top 1 percent income share is lower for "usual" income than it is for current income. In 2012, for example, the top one-percent income share was 20.2 percent using current income and 17.1 percent using permanent income to rank and measure income ( Figure 5 ). In addition, the trends are the same over time for both top-share series. Since the SCF is a triennial survey the cyclical differences in the two approaches to measuring top shares is not as pronounced as it is in the tax data.
IV.B. Persistence -the Probability of Remaining at the Top over Consecutive years
Another way to use the short-panels to explore the relationship of tax-unit-level income volatility on trends in cross-sectional income shares is to calculate the share of tax units identified in a top-income group in one-year (year "t") who were also in that same top-income group in the prior year ("t-1") or in the following year ("t+1"). A decline in these persistence measures would mean that it is becoming more common for tax units to rise into and fall out of top-income groups as incomes of high-income families are increasingly volatile from one year to the next. Declining persistence over the 1998-2012 period would be suggestive of a relationship between rising volatility and top-income shares.
Of the 1,518 returns in the top .001 percent of the 2012 distribution of total income, 635
were also in the top .001 of the 2011 distribution, and 694 were in the top .001 of the 2013 distribution (Table 6) The probability of remaining in a top-income groups over consecutive years increases as we turn from the very richest groups to the somewhat less affluent. The probability of remaining in a top income group over the entire 3-year period centered on 2012 was 37 percent for the top .01
and 73 percent for the top 10 (Figure 8) . The increase in persistence between 1998 and 2013 was greatest among the very highest income groups, but all of the subgroups in the top exhibited some increase over the period.
V. Conclusion
Using a series of 3-year panels of IRS income tax data this paper shows that measures of concentration calculated using permanent income are lower than and less cyclically volatile than those using current income. As a result, current income results in upwardly biased measures of permanent income concentration, and this bias is particularly severe at business cycle peaks in recent decades. The growth in income concentration, however, cannot be explained by this volatility, as growth rates are comparable in the permanent income and annual income groupings during our sample period. Further, the probability of remaining in the highest income groups increased during our sample period, suggesting that top incomes have become less volatile in this dimension. These results are confirmed using household income data measured in the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
